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Once upon a time, procedural law in all its peculiarity stayed home in the scullery,
while public and even private law went oﬀ to attend the European integration ball.
The rules of procedural law were seen as quintessentially domestic and inappropriate for the European stage. EU Member States were said to possess ‘national
procedural and remedial autonomy and competence’,¹ and the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) averted its gaze discretely from the stay-at-home sib. In its classic formulation, the ECJ declared that ‘it is for the domestic legal system of each
Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the
procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection
of the rights which citizens have from the direct eﬀect of Community law . . . ’,
absent ‘Community rules on this subject’.²
This mythical vision of the relationship between the EU and the legal orders
of its Member States has long since vanished, as the glare of the ECJ’s emerging
Union standards governing the adequacy and eﬀectiveness of national procedures
for the enforcement of Union law gradually dispelled the mists surrounding this
repository of national sovereignty.³ Parallel to judicial developments, a growing
* Golden Gate University School of Law.
¹ P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 4th edn
2008), at 306.
² Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralﬁnanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das
Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, 1997. See also Case 45/76 Comet v. Produktschap [1976] ECR 2043.
³ See, e.g., R. Caranta, ‘Judicial Protection Against Member States: A New Jus Commune Takes
Shape’ (1995) 32 CMLR 703; W. van Gerven, ‘Bridging the Gap Between Community and National
Laws: Towards a Principle of Homogeneity in the Field of Legal Remedies?’ (1995) 32 CMLR 679.
For more extended analyses of these developments, see Craig and de Búrca, note 1 above, at 305–43;
M. Dougan, National Remedies before the Court of Justice (Hart, 2004); C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and
P. Skidmore (eds), The Future of Remedies in Europe (Hart, 2000); J. Lindholm, State Procedure and
Union Rights (Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2007).
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⁴ One early example in the context of approximation of laws is the fancy footwork around a range
of procedural and remedial issues found in Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. In recent years, one ﬁnds a growing number of measures explicitly addressing the topic of remedies in regard to a particular sector, such as intellectual property
(Directive 2004/48/EC), the award of public contracts (Directive 2007/66/EC), and the environment (Directive 2004/35/EC).
⁵ Today, Article 6 is applied and interpreted primarily by the European Court of Human Rights,
whereas some decisions in the past were rendered by the European Commission on Human Rights.
See generally N. Mole and C. Harby, The right to a fair trial: A guide to the implementation of Article
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2006). Article 6 may also be
applied directly by the courts of some members of the Council of Europe. See, e.g., T. Öhlinger,
‘Austria and Article 6 of the European Convention’ (1990) 1 EJIL 286.
⁶ Now Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Th e Lisbon
Treaty made a number of important changes in regard to civil justice, some of which bear quick mention, even though they are not directly relevant to the analysis of Storskrubb’s book. First, Lisbon
largely normalized the decision-making procedure in the ﬁeld of civil justice, although the TFEU
continues to require unanimity in regard to measures in the ﬁ eld of family law. Second, the ﬁeld of
‘judicial cooperation in civil matters’ is no longer subject to special limitations on the power of the
ECJ. And third, Lisbon eliminated Article 293 (ex 220) EC Treaty entirely, thereby driving the ﬁnal
nail into the coﬃn of the tradition of intergovernmental cooperation in the ﬁeld of civil justice.
⁷ A. Staudinger and S. Leible, ‘Article 65 of the EC Treaty in the EC System of Competencies’
(2000/01) 4 European Legal Forum 225–35, at 228.
⁸ Peter Hay has described these ﬁelds as ‘neighboring vineyards’. R. Freer (2006) ‘Pondering
the Imponderable and Other Observations from the Intersection of Conﬂicts and Civil Procedure’
Emory University School of Law Public Law & Legal Th eory Research Paper Series No. 06/27, <http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=946957>.
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number of Union regulatory measures have appeared that explicitly address
remedial concerns alongside substantive ones.⁴ Pan-European procedural standards have also emerged from Article 6 of the 1950 European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which articulates the
right to a fair trial.⁵ Last but not least, the incremental movement towards what
numerous authors label a ‘common European law of procedure’ received an enormous boost from Article 65 of the Treaty of Amsterdam,⁶ which made clear that
‘private international and civil law procedures just like certain aspects of general
procedural law are not national domains completely untouched by Community
law.’⁷
Eva Storskrubb’s book – Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncovered –
fast-forwards the reader into the ‘Brave New World’ that has sprung into existence
in the decade since the Treaty of Amsterdam laid a solid (albeit limited) foundation
upon which to erect transnational European procedural and private international
law.⁸ This ambitious book, which grew out of the author’s doctoral dissertation
at the European University Institute, marks an extraordinary contribution to an
emerging ﬁeld by a young scholar, and deserves a place in academic as well as practitioner libraries.
Preliminary remarks about scope are unavoidable, since Storskrubb’s book
carves out an important but awkward slice from one subﬁeld of the civil component of the EU’s ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. The author’s decision to
limit her coverage to a fraction of the procedural subset of issues that constitute
this rapidly emerging ﬁeld makes perfect sense in a doctoral dissertation, as well
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⁹ For example, some would assign jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments to procedure, while others would relegate these topics to private international law.
¹⁰ Article 65 EC Treaty provided that ‘[m]easures in the ﬁeld of judicial cooperation in civil matters . . . shall include:
(a) improving and simplifying:
— the system for cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents,
— cooperation in the taking of evidence,
— the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, including
decisions in extrajudicial cases;
(b) promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning the
conﬂict of laws and of jurisdiction;
(c) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States.’
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as in the context of demand for titles devoted to new areas of EU law. Yet this
decision simultaneously undermines the author’s theoretical project and the
practical usefulness of the book. Th is is not a fatal ﬂaw; indeed, the book succeeds remarkably in being both provocative for the academically minded reader
and informative for the practitioner. But if the title is to fulﬁ ll its potential
and become a perennial, then the author would be well-advised to expand the
book’s coverage to include the full panoply of procedural issues under Article
81 TFEU (ex 65 EC Treaty), if not the entire scope of this still relatively new
policy ﬁeld.
The scope of Article 81 TFEU – like its predecessor, Article 65 EC Treaty – is
bounded by the notoriously imprecise and malleable language ‘judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications’. The open-ended and
amorphous ﬁeld opened up by Article 65 EC Treaty was circumscribed by the
requirement that a measure in this ﬁeld may only be adopted ‘in so far as necessary
for the proper functioning of the internal market’. The Lisbon Treaty appears to
have slipped this noose, and Article 81(2) TFEU now provides that the ‘European
Parliament and the Council . . . shall adopt measures, particularly when necessary for
the proper functioning of the internal market’ (emphasis added). The addition of
the word ‘particularly’ suggests that necessity is no longer an absolute prerequisite
to the adoption of legal measures in the ﬁeld, as it once was, and thus makes it easier for the Commission to justify exercising its right of initiative in the civil justice
ﬁeld.
The Lisbon Treaty did not, however, alter the uneasy ﬁt between the treaty language that demarcates the EU’s competence (‘judicial cooperation in civil matters’)
and the pre-existing labels applied to the diverse issues that have been drawn within
the scope of EU competence. Th is awkwardness stems in part from disagreement
among experts about how to characterize particular issues,⁹ but also reﬂects the fact
that both Articles 81 TFEU and 65 EC Treaty explicitly include an array of procedural issues under their respective aegis, but are by no means limited to procedural
law. Indeed, the bulk of measures communitarized by Article 65 EC Treaty¹⁰ fell
more comfortably under the label ‘private international law’ – deﬁned broadly here
to encompass not only conﬂict of laws but also issues of jurisdiction, recognition
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¹¹ Like procedural law, the topics historically grouped under the labels ‘private international law’
or ‘conﬂict of laws’ were initially left outside the EU’s Treaty framework. Article 220 of the Treaty
of Rome directed the Member States ‘so far as necessary, [to] enter into negotiations with each other’
in order to secure certain beneﬁts for their nationals. The 1968 Brussels Convention (later extended
beyond the boundaries of the EU via the Lugano Convention) was the most important result of such
eﬀorts.
¹² Article 81(1) TFEU provides that the EU ‘shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments
and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of measures for
the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. Article 81(2) adds that the
‘European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures . . . aimed at ensuring: (a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between
Member States of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases; (b) the cross-border service of
judicial and extrajudicial documents; (c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member
States concerning conﬂict of laws and of jurisdiction; (d) cooperation in the taking of evidence; (e)
eﬀective access to justice; (f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the
Member States; (g) the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement; (h) support for the
training of the judiciary and judicial staﬀ ’.
¹³ Today the EU institutions tend to use the label ‘civil justice’ to describe this emerging ﬁeld. I
coined the term ‘EUstitia’ for this purpose. See H. Hartnell, ‘EUstitia: Institutionalizing Justice in
the European Union’ (2002) 23 Northwestern J. Int’ l Law & Business 65–138.
¹⁴ Storskrubb’s chapter on service of documents ably discusses the 2000 Regulation, along with
interpretations by the ECJ, the 2004 study on its operation, and the proposed reforms. However,
Regulation 1393/2007/EC on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, and repealing Council Regulation 1348/2000/EC, [2007] OJ
L 324/79, had not yet been adopted when the book went to press.
¹⁵ At the time the book went to press, Directive 2008/52/EC of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects
of mediation in civil and commercial matters had not yet been adopted, so Storskrubb discusses the
legislative process that followed the Commission’s 2004 initial proposal. Aside from the chapter on
alternative dispute resolution, all other descriptive chapters analyse measures in force.
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and enforcement of judgments, as well as international judicial assistance.¹¹ For its
part, the Lisbon Treaty has expanded the foundation laid by Article 65 EC Treaty
by expressly adding three more arenas to the ﬁeld of civil justice: eﬀective access to
justice, the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement, and support
for the training of the judiciary and judicial staﬀ.¹² These new arenas include both
procedural matters and matters relating to the administration of justice. My aim
here is not to quibble over labels,¹³ but rather to ﬂag the topics elided and suggest
their relevance to Storskrubb’s overarching project, before proceeding to a more
systematic presentation and evaluation of her arguments.
Storskrubb limits her analysis to ten of the measures taken pursuant to Article 65
EC Treaty: service of documents;¹⁴ obtaining evidence; establishing jurisdiction
and enforcing some types of judgments; enforcement of uncontested claims; legal
aid; alternative dispute resolution;¹⁵ payment order; small claims procedure; judicial network; and judicial training and other measures. These are important measures, but so are the topics she omits, namely the EU’s existing (and in some cases
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ongoing proposals for) specialized rules in the area of insolvency proceedings,¹⁶
substantive law,¹⁷ choice of law,¹⁸ family law¹⁹ and succession and wills.²⁰
While Storskrubb can be readily forgiven for hiving oﬀ the huge topic of substantive private law, which in any case is at best tethered to Article 81 (ex 65) by a
gossamer thread, it is harder to justify ignoring family law, insolvency, and choice
of law. These topics are of great practical signiﬁcance, and are closely related to the
topics she does cover. Even more, they have inspired some of the liveliest policy
debates to arise under Article 65 (now 81). For example, the Europeanization of
Downloaded from http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/ at Golden Gate University Law Library on June 22, 2012

¹⁶ See generally J. Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation (Intersentia, 2005); P.J.
Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate, 2004); Wolf-Georg Ringe (2008) ‘Forum Shopping Under
the EU Insolvency Regulation’ Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 33/2008, <http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=1209822>; M. Virgos and F. Garcimartin, Th e European Insolvency
Regulation: Law and Practice (Wolters Kluwer, 2004).
¹⁷ At its meeting on 4–5 June 2009, the Justice and Home Aﬀairs Council adopted detailed
guidelines on the Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law. Council Press Release
10551/09 (Presse 164), at 26–9. The Stockholm Programme for 2010-2014 invited the Commission
to present a proposal, which it did by its Decision 2010/233/EU of 26 April 2010 setting up the
expert group on a Common Frame of Reference in the area of European contract law.
¹⁸ The most recent measures in this ﬁeld are Regulation 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law
applicable to non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II’); Regulation 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on
the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I’); and Regulation 662/2009 of 13 July 2009
establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between Member States
and third countries on particular matters concerning the law applicable to contractual and noncontractual obligations. Meanwhile, the Commission’s 2006 Proposal for a Council Regulation
amending Regulation 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (‘Rome III’) was greeted
by controversy, and ultimately failed to garner unanimous support in the Council. See generally A.
Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: Is the Europeanization of Family Law Going Too
Far?’ (2008) 22 Int’l J. of Law, Policy & the Family 178–205; ‘Justice and Home Aﬀ airs: MEPs
Favour Rome III Regulation on Divorce’ European Report (17 September 2008).
Not to be deterred, ten Member States informed the Commission in 2008 and 2009 that they
wished to establish enhanced cooperation among themselves in the area of applicable law in matrimonial matters. The Commission obliged them in March 2010 by presenting a Proposal for a Council
Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal
separation, COM(2010) 105 ﬁnal. On 12 July 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/405/EU
authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation,
making this the ﬁrst case of ‘enhanced cooperation’ in EU history.
¹⁹ The EU’s key measures in the ﬁeld of family law include (1) Council Regulation 2201/2003
of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (‘Brussels II bis’), which repealed
Regulation 1347/2000 (‘Brussels II’), and (2) Regulation 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to
maintenance obligations. The Rome III regulation (noted in note 18 above) would also have altered
the rules (currently found in Brussels IIbis) on jurisdiction in matrimonial matters and matters of
parental responsibility. Finally, the EU has moved ahead to conclude agreements with third countries in the ﬁeld of family law. See Regulation 664/2009 of 7 July 2009 establishing a procedure
for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between Member States and third countries concerning jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments and decisions in matrimonial matters, matters of parental responsibility and matters relating to maintenance obligations, and the law
applicable to matters relating to maintenance obligations.
²⁰ In October 2009, the Commission presented its Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certiﬁ cate
of Succession, COM(2009)154 ﬁnal.
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²¹ See, e.g., M. Antokolskaia (ed.), Convergence and Divergence of Family Law in Europe
(Intersentia, 2007); D. Bradley, ‘A Family Law for Europe? Sovereignty, Political Economy and
Legitimation’ (2004) 4(1) Global Jurist Frontiers, art. 3; K. Boele-Woelki, Brussels II bis: Its Impact
and its Application in the Member States (Intersentia, 2007); C. McGlynn, Families and the European
Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, 2006); J. Meeusen, M. Pertegás,
G. Straetmans and F. Swennen (eds), International Family Law of the European Union (Intersentia,
2007); H. Stalford, ‘Regulating family life in post-Amsterdam Europe’ (2003) 28 European Law
Review 39–52. See also The Law Society of Scotland (2008) ‘Freedom, security and justice: what will
be the future? European commission consultation on priorities for the next ﬁve years (2010–2014)’,
<http://www.lawscot.org.uk>.
²² See V. Heuzé, ‘Lettre ouverte au Président de la République’ (2006) JCP G, act. 586 (signed
by 39 other law professors); P. Lagarde, H. Gaudemet-Tallon and C. Kessedjian ‘Observations sur la
lettre ouverte au président de la République intitulée “L’Union européenne, la démocratie et l’État de
droit”’ (2007) JCP G, act. 18 (signed by 74 other law professors).
²³ I do not mean to equate these civil procedural issues with the more politically salient issues
that the Treaty of Amsterdam added as Article IV EC Treaty – notably visas, asylum, immigration,
and other matters related to the free movement of persons – or with the EU’s expanding activities
in the ﬁeld of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Still, the issues covered by Article
81 (ex 65) are not value-neutral, and have signiﬁcant social and politico-economic implications. In
this sense, I wish to argue that they deserve more attention than they received in the ﬁrst wave of
leading books and symposia on the AFSJ as such. Compare S. Peers, EU justice and home aﬀ airs law
(Longman, 1st edn 2000) with S. Peers, EU justice and home aﬀ airs law (Oxford University Press,
2nd edn 2006) (the author notes that the second edition is three times as long and only carries forward about 5% of the original text; both mentioned civil cooperation, but neither provides in-depth
coverage). The European Law Journal devoted vol. 10(2) to Article IV EC Treaty in 2004, but no article in that issue analyses civil justice. See also R. Bieber and J. Monar (eds), Justice and Home Aﬀ airs
in the European Union: The Development of the Third Pillar (European Interuniversity Press, 1995)
(out of 23 chapters, the barest mention of civil justice in a 6-page chapter); N. Walker (ed.), Europe’s
Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (Oxford University Press, 2004) (no discussion of civil justice).
Naturally one can ﬁnd substantial discussion of the civil justice issues in specialized journals devoted
to procedural and private international law. For recent book-length treatments see M. Bogdan,
Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2006); A. Jokela,
L. Ervo and M. Gräns (eds), Europeanization of Procedural Law and the New Challenges to Fair Trial
(Europa Law Publishing, 2009); and P. Stone, EU Private International Law: Harmonization of Laws
(Edward Elgar, 2006).
²⁴ Chapters 1–5 lay out the author’s basic analytical framework and the background of developments pursuant to Article 65, while chapters 16 and 17 contain her conclusions about the ‘legitimacy
of the policy area’ and discuss the way forward.
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family law has received sustained critical attention, alongside the ‘bandwagon’ (i.e.
pro-Europeanization) literature,²¹ while the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations set oﬀ a ﬁrestorm among French academics.²² Any
eﬀort to uncover the policy area implicated by Article 81 TFEU (ex 65 EC Treaty)
is incomplete if it sidesteps these occasionally searing debates.
And yet, despite these limitations, Storskrubb does a great service by bringing
many dimensions of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) into
the limelight. After years of being largely overlooked by the bulk of publications
that examined the AFSJ (or before that, the Third Pillar) as such,²³ the author does
more than just bring this Cinderella topic to the ball, which in itself is cause to
rejoice. Storskrubb also gives civil justice a spin around the dance ﬂoor with the
Prince – with apologies to Machiavelli – by exploring in some depth the policy
implications of this emerging ﬁeld.
Storskrubb’s approach to this complex ﬁeld is clear, as are her stated goals. The
book consists of two sets of overarching chapters,²⁴ which bracket ten detailed
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²⁵ The book covers developments through to 31 August 2007.
²⁶ The terms ‘rättsligt samarbete’ and ‘oikeudellinen yhteistyö’ are used in Swedish and in Finnish
respectively.
²⁷ Th is occasional unevenness appears linked to the presence or absence of academic commentary
upon which her highly synthetic analysis draws.
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chapters in which the author describes and analyses each of the measures (listed
above) individually. The book also boasts numerous appendices that contain the
texts of the speciﬁc measures analysed and a few key EU policy documents, as well
as an extensive bibliography. As such, the book provides an excellent starting point
for anyone interested in Article 81 TFEU (ex 65 EC Treaty). It is detailed and accurate enough to bring any reader up to speed quickly,²⁵ and is endowed with enough
historical, statutory and academic resources to provide all readers with conﬁdent
guidance for future research. That particular audiences – practitioners, academics,
policy-makers – might wish for more is not so much a weakness of this particular
book as it is a limitation of the book form itself, particularly in such a fast-moving
ﬁeld.
In addition to its dogged thoroughness, Storskrubb’s book has a number of
strengths. The book is meticulously well-organized, which allows the reader to
follow a long path through complex materials without ever having the sense of
being lost. The book is readable and well edited, and the author makes outstanding use of French, Swedish and Finnish language sources, in addition to the ubiquitous English. The Nordic contributions are particularly intriguing, notably
her discussion (pp. 295–301) of theories about the functions of procedure and
her remark (pp. 11–12) that ‘legal cooperation in civil matters’ is a more accurate
translation of the terminology found in the Finnish and Swedish texts²⁶ than the
more limited ‘judicial cooperation’ found in English. I wish that the Nordic literature – indicated by her citations to works by Knuts, Lindell, Ervasti, Lindblom and
Virolainen – were available in more widely accessible languages, but it suﬃces here
to appreciate Storskrubb’s enrichment of the comparative debate.
Storskrubb aims to provide a ‘holistic evaluation’ of the policy ﬁeld. This she
achieves ably, subject to the scope limitations noted above and the methodological reservations expressed below. Her analysis of the particulars is not only precise
and detailed, but also contextualized, insofar as she links her micro-level analysis
to macro policy debates and themes in European integration. Finally, Storskrubb
explore the broader implications of this emerging ﬁeld, and oﬀers a wealth of
insights, arguments, and critiques, along with constructive suggestions for the way
forward.
In discussing each of the ten measures, Storskrubb follows a standard template:
ﬁrst legislative history, followed by substantive content, and ﬁ nally the normative implications. Her concise analyses of content are in many respects original,
and combine close textual analysis with analysis of relevant case law, if any, and
key underlying debates. She does an excellent job of presenting both sides of the
issues, although some chapters (e.g. service of documents) are stronger than others
(e.g. evidence).²⁷ Overall, the author demonstrates not only a high level of skill at
handling a countless array of technical issues, but also a ﬁerce commitment to fac-
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²⁸ See Hartnell (2002), note 13 above, at pp. 112–38.
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ing diﬃcult issues head-on, rather than steering a safe middle course. In short, the
book suﬃces as, but also surpasses what one would expect to ﬁnd in a practitioners’
manual.
In terms of context, Storskrubb provides a multi-faceted and nuanced discussion
of institutional and structural features of the EU ﬁeld (chapter 4). Her analyses of
the problems surrounding Article 68, preliminary reference, and the evolution of
the Commission’s role are particularly good. She provides a basic but serviceable
overview of the ECHR and the Charter (pp. 85–6, 200) and the tensions surrounding their relationships to the emerging EU ﬁeld of civil justice, and notes
parallel developments in the domestic context (pp. 284–89) and in the ﬁeld of
international civil procedure (pp. 289–95). However, her analysis of these broader
contextual issues is sketchy, and a more searching examination of their relationship to EU developments would be welcome. If these questions get short shrift, it is
because Storskrubb is more concerned to explore the meaning of the EU developments themselves.
The book enriches discussions about EU civil justice – or, in her narrower terminology, procedural law – by linking the topic to broader theoretical and policy
debates on integration, including subsidiarity, proportionality, and governance.
The author’s analysis of citizenship and its relationship to civil justice builds on
a competent (if not comprehensive) synthesis of legal and political science literature of citizenship, and is one of the strongest interdisciplinary contributions of
the book. By promoting the realization of rights in practice, civil procedure is a
practical tool that ‘might in fact provide the true core for creating the justice facet
of the civil part of citizenship in Europe’ more eﬀectively than ‘bland policy statements’ (p. 86).
Storskrubb is at her best when writing about the ‘European Judicial Network’
(chapter 14) and about ‘Judicial Training and Other Measures’ (chapter 15). These
truly interdisciplinary chapters build admirably on early work exploring the
broader signiﬁcance of these developments using new institutional theory.²⁸ She
bucks the common tendency to ignore these ‘soft’ institutional measures when
writing about developments pursuant to Article 65, and grasps their transformative potential. Storskrubb rightly sees these ‘holistic’ structural innovations as the
key to the success of the European Judicial Area: they are ‘not an adjunct to the
[speciﬁc single practical measures] or a further step on the road, but . . . an important preceding step to make the policy ﬁeld work eﬀectively’ (p. 253). Thus, notwithstanding the decentralization that characterizes measures in the ﬁ eld, these
innovations paradoxically Europeanize Member State courts by establishing new
organized fora in which European discourse and policy coordination will occur,
and constitute an ‘institutional shift from the purely national to the supranational
level’ (p. 239). These new cooperative structures, despite their stated goal of serving as a mechanism to foster diversity, oﬀer ‘several incentives for convergence in
a process which creates trust and cooperative orientations among participants and
encourages learning dynamics’ (pp. 239–40). Storskrubb argues that they ‘resem-
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²⁹ Here Storskrubb borrows an apt analogy to technological hardware and software from
K. Kerameus, ‘Procédure civile nationale et exigences communautaires’ in M. Bandrac et al. (eds),
Justice et droits fondamentaux. Etudes oﬀ ertes à Jacques Normand (Litec, 2003), pp. 253–9, at 256–7
(observing that the upgrading of software can sometimes be prevented by older hardware).
³⁰ As explored further below, the author’s approach to the desirability of the new policy area is
prospective rather than retroactive, insofar as she notes that ‘once there is at least the beginning of a
truly European judicial space, it is pertinent to consider its eﬀects and whether or in which direction
we support its further development, i.e. to discuss its appropriateness’ (p. 271).
³¹ In particular, she welcomes the trend towards decentralization and the establishment of direct
cross-border cooperative channels; the concomitant abolition (or streamlining) of the traditional
diplomatic mechanisms found in international civil procedure; the eﬀ orts to avoid delay, simplify
procedural mechanisms and improve access to justice; the introduction of minimum standards and
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ble the centralization features of the comitology system’ and are tantamount to
‘new governance in procedural law’ (p. 240). Moreover, the European Judicial
Training Network, where the aim of creating European judicial culture has been
most explicit, has the potential to overcome ‘insurmountable obstacles’ rooted in
‘the diverse organization of justice in the Member States and the ideological antagonisms between procedural systems’ (p. 252).²⁹
Storskrubb’s chapters on the European Judicial Network and the European
Judicial Training Network do more than just join a transdisciplinary discussion
about integration. They also articulate a forceful critique of the weaknesses in the
structure as it currently exists – i.e. its participatory deﬁciency and lack of openness – and oﬀer explicit recommendations for overcoming them (p. 244–5). The
author not only encourages more participation by stakeholders, but recommends
expanding the European Judicial Network into a ‘general coordinating structure
for civil procedural regulation,’ so that it may become a ‘real tool for building a
genuine European area of justice’ (p. 245).
As this conclusion suggests, Storskrubb embraces the project of building the
European Judicial Area. This does not mean, however, that she greets developments uncritically. Her overall approach is to take this new policy area as a given
and then seek to perfect it, rather than extending her critique to the decision to
Europeanize civil justice in the ﬁrst place.³⁰ After laying out a detailed diagnosis, the author makes numerous concrete suggestions for improvement. While
Storskrubb’s argument is complex and at times diﬃcult to unravel, the diligent
reader will be rewarded by her ﬁnal chapters, which pull the threads together.
Storskrubb’s ‘holistic’ approach proceeds by assessing the ‘functionality’ (or
eﬀectiveness) and the ‘legitimacy’ of the policy area. Given her premise that ‘functionality is the key to legitimacy’ (p. 301) and her meticulous identiﬁcation of ﬂaws
that impede functionality, it comes as no surprise that the author’s conclusions
are negative and indicative of a ‘legitimacy crisis’ (p. 304). Storskrubb especially
bemoans the ‘ideological or visionary weakness’ in the policy ﬁeld (p. 302), which
leads to an overemphasis on ‘purely negative’ forms of integration and on market
values such as eﬃciency, at the expense of other values also implicit in the procedural ﬁeld.
Despite the author’s warm embrace of many of the principal characteristics of
the new policy area,³¹ her preliminary conclusion is that the current system is riddled with ‘dark characteristics’ (p. 262) that threaten the success of the EU’s civil
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the principle of mutual recognition; and the introduction of techniques that promote transparency,
such as the duty to cooperate and share information (pp. 260–1).
³² She also identiﬁes a number of missing pieces needed to complete the policy area, including
procedural sanctions, enforcement procedures, interim remedies, and measures pertaining to the
transparency of the debtor’s assets (pp. 265–6). Along these lines, the Commission presented a Green
Paper on improving the eﬃciency of the enforcement of judgments in the EU: The Attachment of
Bank Accounts, COM(2006) 618. A proposal for a Regulation on a European system for the attachment of bank accounts is planned for late 2010.
³³ Article 68(1) EC Treaty, which was deleted by the Lisbon Treaty, provided: ‘Article 234 [EC
Treaty, now Article 267 TFEU] shall apply to [Title IV EC Treaty] under the following circumstances and conditions: where a question on the interpretation of this title or on the validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community based on this title is raised in a case pending
before a court or a tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
under national law, that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.’
³⁴ Case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European
Union [2000] ECR I-8419.
³⁵ ‘The function of dignity and participation, as well as the political legal debate function, underscore procedural human rights and the importance of the adversarial process itself in upholding certain values and resolving disputes in a larger sense than just the case at hand. These concerns as well
as a more searching concern for consumers of the civil justice system are reinforced in the therapeutic
function’ (p. 302).
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justice policy area.³² Notably, the decentralization that characterizes most of the
measures appears destined to produce further diversity (discriminatory treatment)
and fragmentation (incoherence), given the diﬀ erent levels of court resources and
ability prevailing in the Member States and the overall complexity of the new rules
(pp. 262–3). Storskrubb concludes that ‘transparency, simplicity and legal certainty’ will be diﬃcult to achieve, and sees ‘the potential for abuse and injustice’
that threaten to curtail defendants’ rights (p. 263). These ﬂaws were magniﬁed by
the limits imposed on the use of the preliminary reference procedure in this policy
area (pp. 264–5), i.e. only courts from which there is no appeal could refer questions to the ECJ under Article 68 EC Treaty.³³
In her prospective exploration of the appropriateness of further development of
the policy area (pp. 272–84), Storskrubb neatly ﬁ ngers the dilemma that bedevils
the ﬁeld and threatens to hamstring progress toward achieving EUstitia. In the
cautious regulatory atmosphere that has emerged in the EU since the ECJ’s 2000
decision in the Tobacco Advertising case,³⁴ the author sees a ‘constitutional conundrum’ surrounding further incursions into national regulatory autonomy in the
ﬁeld of civil justice, which appears most overtly in contests over interpretation of
the crucial language ‘matters having cross-border implications’ found in Article 81
(ex 65). This situation tends to ‘weaken the drive of the policy area and . . . its practical implementation, thereby impacting negatively on legitimacy’ (p. 283). Given
her assessment that the policy area is both ﬂawed and incomplete, Storskrubb fears
that any general reluctance to forge ahead will stunt needed growth.
Rather than being discouraged by her negative assessments, Storskrubb oﬀers
concrete prescriptions. First, she urges a move away from ‘mere negative’ and
towards more positive integration (pp. 283, 304–5). She argues that eﬃciency
must not be the only goal, and proposes to enrich the EU’s vision by attending to
the social functions of procedure.³⁵ Second, to temper the introduction of mutual
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³⁶ In this context, the author notes ‘an interesting proposal to secure coherence and further
transparency . . . , namely to consolidate the various measures into a ‘code’, which might counter the
piecemeal nature of the numerous existing legislative measures and . . . be more accessible to users’
(p. 306).
³⁷ For example, the author’s assertion that the ‘business community should be oﬀ ered some degree
of legal certainty’ (p. 145) disorients the reader, who wonders who is speaking.
³⁸ I am peculiarly susceptible to the stimulus of causal language, since my current research
focuses on explaining how Article 65 and the Tampere program came about. See H.E. Hartnell
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recognition – which entails the abolition of exequator and some limits on using
the ordre public defence – she insists that minimum procedural guarantees must
be set in order to foster mutual trust, which is the sine qua non of the European
Judicial Area. In particular, she calls for ‘harmonization of rights of the defence
or centralization’ to address the challenges facing litigants in cases having crossborder implications (p. 309). Th ird, Storskrubb proposes a ‘consolidation strategy’
aimed at counteracting fragmentation and improving coherence in the policy area
(pp. 305–7).³⁶ And ﬁnally, the author notes that EU developments are not taking
place in a vacuum, and suggests that global regulation might be more appropriate
than ‘solely Eurocentric’ measures (pp. 284–302, 311). While one might quibble
with the viability of these proposals, the author makes a strong case for each of
them, and deserves to be read seriously.
While it is impossible to do justice here to the subtlety and comprehensiveness of
Storskrubb’s analysis, I have sought to summarize her key arguments and identify
her major contributions. My remaining task is to oﬀer some critical perspectives
on this ambitious and largely successful book. Below I explore three problematic
issues, all of which have a methodological slant and are thus potentially of general interest, insofar as they are endemic to much legal writing about European
integration.
The ﬁrst problem relates to the matter of voice. In a work that aims to provide
‘normative’ assessments relating to the ‘legitimacy’ of a policy area, it is incumbent
upon the author to explicate the criteria upon which her judgments rest. In many
instances, this author applauds a decision by the ECJ (pp. 105–7), or describes
some ‘very welcome’ reform (p. 125) or innovation (p. 141), without hinting at the
criteria that undergird her opinion. While these do become more apparent in the
ﬁnal chapters of the book (p. 279 ﬀ.), the reader wishes to know earlier on why the
author stakes out particular positions. This problem is accentuated by the highly
synthetic nature of Storskrubb’s chapters analysing individual measures. In numerous instances, the reader cannot tell if the author is expressing her own views, or
paraphrasing arguments advanced by EU institutions or other scholars.³⁷
The second problem is potentially more troubling. The book contains numerous assertions that lack supporting evidence or argument. While this is common
in legal scholarship, one wishes for more in a work that proclaims its historical
and interdisiplinary ambitions. To be fair, Storskrubb’s main goals are analytical
and normative rather than causal or historical. Still, her frequent resort to the language of causality had me lurching like a Pavlovian dog in repeated vain attempts
to sniﬀ out the foundation of her claims.³⁸ In some cases, the author’s language is
puzzling and leads the reader to wonder what (if any) argument hides below the
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‘Institutionalizing Civil Justice in the EU: Legal Elites and Ideologies in Transnational Governance’
(forthcoming).
³⁹ To be fair, the author does press a bit further in regard to the ﬁrst of these assertions. In connection with parallel reforms of domestic civil procedure taking place in some EU countries (pp.
284–9), she claims that there is a ‘clear interaction, which at ﬁrst was only one-way, with domestic
trends being carried over to the supranational level’ (p. 289). While it may in fact be true that the
EU is parroting Member State developments, Storskrubb does not provide enough background or
historical data to back up her argument. Worse, two of the examples she cites – domestic civil procedure reform in Austria and Germany – postdate developments at EU level, which cast doubt upon
her claim.
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surface, such as where she notes the ‘historical coincidence between the genesis
of Union citizenship and judicial cooperation in civil matters’ (p. 83), or where
she observes that ‘supranational rules within the EU are not the only emanation
of international procedural development that mirrors the trends and themes of
domestic procedural reform’ (p. 289). Both of these statements hint at some relationship among events beyond sheer coincidence, but stop short of exploring what
they might be.³⁹
This second problem appears harmless in some instances, but becomes serious
in others. For example, Storskrubb’s failure to look more deeply into the relationship between developments in the EU and those in the framework of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law casts a shadow over her recommendation
that regulation at the international level might be more appropriate than at the
regional level (e.g. pp. 301, 310). However welcome her recommendation may be,
it begs the question whether diﬃculties encountered in the Hague framework may
be causally related to the decision to communitarize civil justice issues in the ﬁrst
place.
Even more troubling is the use of causal language without explicating the underlying argument. In one instance, Storskrubb asserts that certain policy concerns
‘no doubt inﬂuence the Community institutions’ (p. 135) and that the ‘principle
of judicial protection elaborated by the Court of Justice . . . precipitated’ the emergence of the new policy ﬁeld (p. 309), while elsewhere she speculates that the White
Paper on Governance may have inﬂuenced the (chronologically prior) European
Judicial Network (p. 238). Although rarely necessary to her overall analysis, such
statements raise diﬃcult questions that are of great concern to many – particularly
social scientists and historians – who seek a deeper and more precise understanding
of the process of European integration. Overall, these feints lead to a quasi-causal
mode of analysis that makes it impossible to challenge her assertions and impedes
transdisciplinary communication.
Many legal scholars write solely for their own discipline, but this, I believe, is less
viable in the ﬁeld of European studies, where some issues – such as the institutional
implications of Europeanized civil justice – are also relevant for scholars outside
the narrow conﬁnes of legal discourse. In such cases, legal scholars should make a
greater eﬀort to build bridges to facilitate transdisciplinary communication. One
step in this direction would be to refrain from using causal language, unless we
intend to follow through and make the argument.
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⁴⁰ For example, she notes that ‘with the rapid expansion of the policy area, [the EU] may speed
ahead of domestic reform processes and become the source for the domestic level of the goals of simpliﬁcation and procedural economy and may create spillover potential in the aims as well as in the
elaborated rules’ (pp. 288–9; see also p. 185).
⁴¹ For example, she uses the term to characterize Denmark’s belated agreement to participate in
some of the civil justice measures (p. 274).
⁴² E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford
University Press, 1958).
⁴³ See A. Arnull ‘The Americanization of EU Law Scholarship’ in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout and
T. Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford
University Press, 2008), pp. 415–30.
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My third and ﬁnal quibble pertains to another technique for building bridges
that could facilitate transdisciplinary communication and avoid unnecessary
confusion. Caution is needed when using terms – like ‘Rosebud’ – that appear
innocuous but are in play and freighted with meaning. For example, Storskrubb
mentions ‘spillover’ often, but her meaning is not always clear. In some cases, she
is referring to the spread of innovations from the EU to the Member States,⁴⁰ but
elsewhere her meaning is less obvious.⁴¹ What is clear, however, is that she does
not use the term to mean expansion of tasks within the EU from one policy ﬁeld
to another, as the term has been used in political science literature commencing
with Haas.⁴² My aim here is not to insist that one usage is correct and the other
incorrect, but rather to suggest that such concepts are loaded and should be used
to build channels of communication between – rather than impermeable walls
around – disciplinary discourses. To take another terminological example, the
concept of ‘legitimacy’ is vital to Storskrubb’s analysis, as it is to broader debates
about democracy in the Union. Her frequent invocation of the term leads the
reader to wonder ﬁrst, how she would know legitimacy when she sees it, and second, whether there is any common ground between what she has in mind and
broader academic debates on this topic. At one point, the author argues that the
harmony between developments in Member States and the EU ‘undoubtedly
increases the political legitimacy and acceptance of supranational action’ (p. 301),
but this is a claim that calls at the very least for further explication, if not for
empirical evidence as well.
To conclude, I neither disdain⁴³ nor argue for abandoning the traditional enterprise of legal scholarship. But I do believe that legal scholars can (and should) play
a larger role in discussions about European integration and globalization, and that
enhanced dialogue based on a two-way conversation across disciplinary boundaries is desirable. Just imagine how much richer political science literature would be
if scholars in that discipline had a deeper appreciation for the nuances of the EU’s
legal system.

